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The effects of corporate governance on information disclosure, timeliness and 






Using a sample of Canadian firms for the period 2002-2007, we examine whether 
Corporate Governance (CG) has a significant influence on the frequency of firms’ 
disclosures, the timeliness of price discovery or on market participants’ (analysts’) 
behavior in Canada.  Our models use both aggregate and underlying measures of CG 
to help identify which particular aspects of CG are more influential.  Our results 
suggest only certain components of CG are associated with the number of releases to 
the stock market and the timeliness of information discovery in firm’s stock price. 
With regard to analysts’ earnings forecasts evidence suggests better CG results in 
more informative disclosures; the aggregate CG measure is associated with greater 
forecast accuracy, lower dispersion in forecasts and greater analyst following.  Our 
results confirm CG can play a significant role in determining the efficiency of a 
country’s equity market. 
 
JEL: G30; G38; M40. 






A common response to Corporate Governance (CG) failure (e.g. BCCI in the UK, 
Enron in the USA) has been to increase disclosure requirements, typically 
accompanied by greater and more stringent CG expectations through new codes of 
good practice.  CG refers to the structures and systems in place (both within and 
external to the firm) to reduce agency problems and align managers’ interests with 
shareholders (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). How a firm is governed and 
monitored should therefore have an impact on its transparency and level of disclosure 
as potentially increased disclosure could be associated with a lower cost of capital 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012).  This paper seeks to provide further insight into the 
relationship between a firm’s CG and the informativeness of disclosures to the market 
in Canada.   
 
Our study builds substantially on preliminary work completed for Australian firms by 
Beekes and Brown (2006) by using a panel of data and improved estimation methods 
which provide more robust results.  Canada is particularly appropriate to carry out our 
study as CG guidelines are similar to those adopted in Australia, in that they require 
compliance with the CG best practice recommendations or disclosure where these 
have not been followed, along with an explanation of why this is the case (Collett and 
Hrasky, 2005).  Also the industry composition of listed Canadian firms includes many 
mining firms, similar to Australia, so incentives for firm disclosure should be similar 
in Canada.  Also full and transparent continuous disclosure is expected by the Toronto 




Our key research question is ‘does a firm’s CG impact on the information flows to the 
market and are these information flows more informative?’  We use a number of 
approaches to answer this question.  Firstly we examine the frequency of corporate 
disclosures to the market with the expectation that firms with better1 CG will release 
more information.  However, acknowledging that this is not the only source of 
information about performance we examine the information content of a firm’s stock 
price to investigate whether CG is associated with the speed with which value relevant 
information is integrated into share prices.  The expectation is that firms with better 
CG will have more timely releases of information and thereby faster price discovery.  
Also, if information released by a firm with better CG is more credible then CG will 
impact on market participants’ (i.e. analysts’) beliefs about the firm’s future 
performance.  For this we examine the bias and accuracy in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, the dispersion in analyst forecasts (a measure of analysts’ disagreement), 
and the number of analysts tracking the firm. We expect firms with better CG will be 
associated with greater analyst following and forecasts that are less optimistically 
biased, have greater accuracy with lower disagreement in forecasts across different 
analysts.   
 
Using a sample of S&P/TSX composite index Canadian firms between 2002 and 
2007, we confirm that certain elements of CG are important for firm’s disclosure.  
Specifically we find that the structure of the board of directors and its committees, 
along with the balance in holding and voting rights on share capital and the board’s 
decision output all positively influence the quantity of disclosure (as proxied by the 
number of documents released).  Contrary to prior research results from Beekes and 
Brown (2006), we find little evidence to suggest that the timeliness of price discovery 
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is affected by CG in Canada.  With regard to analyst earnings forecast properties, we 
find greater accuracy and greater consensus in forecasts for firms with better CG, 
whereas Beekes and Brown (2006) find better CG is associated with greater 
disagreement for their sample of Australian firms.  Also Canadian firms with better 
CG do attract a larger following of analysts.  
 
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways.  First, we use a panel of data 
and fixed effects panel estimation methods to re-examine prior results in Beekes and 
Brown (2006) which was conducted using one year of CG data for Australian firms 
and Ordinary Least Squares Methods.  Fixed effects panel methods used in this study 
have the advantage of enabling us to control for unobserved time invariant firm fixed 
effects and potentially offer more robust results.  Second, using an index of CG 
developed by the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness we 
examine aggregate and specific aspects of CG.  The CG indices are described in detail 
below and measure board independence, directors’ ownership, board and board 
committee structure and voting rights, performance evaluation systems and board 
decision output.  They are summarized in an overall index of CG.  We are thereby 
able to examine particular components of CG to investigate which are more 
influential.  Third, we examine Canada which is of particular interest due to the 
significant number of resource and financial firms, which represent a large proportion 
of the S&P/TSX composite index, and the large number of firms with concentrated 




The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related literature and develops 
the hypotheses. This is followed by section 3 which describes the research method 
and data.  Section 4 discusses our results and the final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Corporate Governance in Canada 
Until 2005, companies in Canada were required to disclose their compliance with 14 
CG guidelines under Section 474 of the Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual 
(Toronto Stock Exchange, 2003; 2004b).  The CG guidance amongst other aspects 
indicates that (i) the board should be of an appropriate size and comprise a majority of 
independent directors, (ii) board committees (audit, compensation and nomination) 
should have exclusively outside director membership (and of these there should be a 
majority of independent outside directors), (iii) there should be a separate CEO and 
independent Chairman (or lead independent director) and (iv) there should be a policy 
of offering continuing education for directors (Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004a).  This 
is comparable with CG guidance found in other countries (e.g. Australia and UK) and 
is adopted on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.  In 2005, some minor changes were made 
to the guidance including clarifying the definition of independence of directors, and 
CG guidance is now under Section 472 of the Toronto Stock Exchange Company 
Manual.2   
 
Given the similarity of CG guidance in Canada with many other countries, it is 
perhaps surprising that there has been relatively little research on CG in Canada; prior 
research on CG has tended to focus on the US.  However Canada is of interest in its 
own right given the different sector composition of the stock market compared with 
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other countries, the level of cross-listing of Canadian firms on the major stock 
exchanges in the U.S.A., and the impact of ownership concentration.  The evidence to 
date on the impact of CG in Canada has been mixed: Jog and Dutta (2004) find no 
evidence to suggest a link between CG and a firm’s share market performance (as 
measured by returns, after controlling for industry and the market to book ratio). 
Wheeler and Davies (2006) find little evidence that CG is linked to changes in firm 
value for the largest Canadian firms on Toronto Stock Exchange.  However, for a sub-
sample of firms which increased their CG ranking during their sample period, they 
found a significant positive association with long-term changes in market 
capitalization.  Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) find evidence of a positive link 
between firm valuation (as measured by Tobin’s Q) and overall CG.   
 
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) study CG disclosures of TSE 300 firms and found that 
very few had adopted all of the CG best practice guidelines and there was a large 
variation in disclosure practices.  They did however find a positive association 
between CG and disclosure for larger firms, highly levered firms and firms with more 
outside directors.  We seek to provide further evidence on the link between CG and 
disclosure in Canada which, to our knowledge, has not yet fully been investigated in 
the literature.   
 
2.2 Frequency and Timeliness of Disclosure 
Frequent disclosure of information to the stock market is important to keep investors 
informed of firm performance and upcoming developments.  Prior evidence has found 
that monitoring provided by CG is positively associated with firm disclosure levels 
(Beekes and Brown, 2006; Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; Li, Mangena and 
7 
 
Pike, 2012) and poorly governed firms are associated with lower disclosure levels 
(Bassett, Koh and Tutticci, 2007; Ettredge, Johnstone, Stone and Wang, 2011).  The 
Toronto Stock Exchange envisages a setting where “everyone investing in securities 
has equal access to information that may affect their investment decisions” (Toronto 
Stock Exchange, 2004a, 1) and “material announcements are factual and balanced.” 
Therefore “unfavorable news must be disclosed just as promptly and completely as 
favorable news” (Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004a, 5).  Clearly, compliance with the 
disclosure guidelines is important for firms and we would anticipate firms with better 
CG would be likely to disclose more information.  Based upon this, we predict: 
 
H1A: Firms with better CG will be associated with greater disclosure of 
information to the stock market. 
H1B: Firms with better CG will be associated with greater balance in 
disclosure (i.e. disclose both bad and good news) to the market. 
 
Timely disclosure of information is a requirement of listing and in addition to the 
guidance provided in National Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standards, the Toronto 
Stock Exchange also has a policy statement on the timeliness of firms’ disclosures 
(Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004a).   “Timeliness” in our paper refers to the speed with 
which value relevant information is incorporated into share prices.  Managers are 
likely to wish to disclose impending bad news on a timely basis for fear of potential 
litigation of reputation costs if disclosures are not timely (Skinner, 1994). Prior 
research has shown Australian firms with better CG have value relevant information 
reflected on a more timely basis in their prices (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  We 
predict that Canadian firms with higher CGQ are more forthcoming and balanced in 
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their disclosures (i.e. both good and bad news will have comparable timeliness), 
consistent with the CG guidelines, and are as a consequence priced more efficiently in 
the market, i.e., in a timelier fashion: 
 
H2A: Firms with better CG will be associated with more timely price 
discovery. 
H2B: Firms with better CG will be associated with more balance in disclosures 
and good news will have comparable timeliness to bad news.  
 
2.3 Analyst Following and Analyst Forecast Properties 
The level of disclosure by the firm and the increased credibility of disclosures by 
firms with better CG are likely to impact on market participants’ (analysts’) 
expectations. Prior literature has shown that if there is greater information disclosure, 
more institutional investors and analysts may be attracted to the firm (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999).   The quantity of 
disclosure is positively related to analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy (Hope, 2003; 
Vanstraelen, Zarzeski and Robb, 2003).  In addition, the quality of these disclosures is 
important for the precision of forecasts (Byard and Shaw, 2003).  There is already a 
building literature linking CG and forecast accuracy and results from Beekes and 
Brown (2006) and Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) show CG is positively associated 
with analyst forecast accuracy. 
 
However, evidence on the impact of information quality and quantity on the 
dispersion in forecasts is at best inconclusive; consensus in analyst forecasts may 
decline around earnings announcements as this provides analysts with incentives to 
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generate their own information (Barron, Byard and Kim. 2002; Barron, Harris and 
Stanford, 2005).  Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that firms with more informative 
disclosure policies have less dispersed analyst forecasts.    Nonetheless Australian 
firms with higher CG have been found to have greater dispersion (disagreement) in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Beekes and Brown, 2006).    Due to the conflict in prior 
evidence, we offer no hypothesis for the level of dispersion in forecasts.   
 
Based upon the discussion above, we predict the following: 
H3A: Firms with better CG are associated with less optimistically biased 
forecasts 
H3B: Firms with better CG are associated with more accurate forecasts 
H3C: Firms with better CG are associated with greater analyst following 
 
3. Data and Method  
3.1 Sample and Data 
Our sample period is from January 2002 to December 2007 as this predates the 2008 
financial crisis and our CG measure has comparable underlying CG variable measures 
during this period.  The firms included in our study are included on the S&P/TSX 
Composite Index (which is the headline index for Canadian firms) and rated on the 
Board Shareholder Confidence Index Report (BSCI)3.  The BSCI reports contain CG 
ratings for firms on an annual basis.  We use two datasets in our analysis: (i) 
Documents and Timeliness, which are on an annual basis and (ii) Analysts’ forecast 




For the frequency of disclosure and timeliness data, the number of documents released 
is collected from the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR)4, and daily share prices, returns and market index data are from Datastream. 
The date of the annual earnings announcement is sourced from Bloomberg, 
Compustat, Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), Reuters and 
Worldscope.  Where there is a conflict in the announcement dates from these five 
sources, we take the earliest plausible date.  Other financial and industrial sector data 
is obtained from Worldscope.  The final sample for the frequency of disclosure and 
timeliness models includes 1,079 firm-year observations.5   
 
For the analyst forecast and following models, we collect from I/B/E/S monthly 
forecasts for annual Earnings Per Share where at least 4 analysts contribute their 
forecasts for a horizon of between 1 and 11 months. Data for market values are 
sourced from Datastream, and financial data and industry classifications are from 
Worldscope.  Firms traded on the Canadian option market are sourced from the 
Montreal stock exchange website. The final sample is 7,149 firm-month observations 
for the analyst models.6    
 
3.2 Measuring Corporate Governance  
We use the 2003 – 2008 annual BSCI reports to measure CG.7  In addition to 
examining structures of CG such as the level of board and committee independence, 
the separation of the CEO and Chairman of the Board typical of other CG datasets, 
this dataset specifically controls for family ownership structures which result in 
differing holding and voting rights and is therefore particularly appropriate for a study 
of Canadian companies.  In our analysis we assume that the current year CG report 
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relates to governance in place in the prior financial year and we match this data to the 
same period of financial data.  The BSCI reports include an overall measure of CG 
(Total) where each company is ranked in the report from AAA+ (highest) to C 
(lowest), whereby AAA+ represents highest-quality CG structures and C represents 
the other extreme.  We use the actual numeric deductions from the 100 points 
awarded (for ‘perfect’ CG) used in the BSCI as detailed in the glossary which 
accompanies the reports.  This creates a non-linear scale increasing in CG quality.8  In 
addition to an overall measure of CG, there are five underlying measures of CG which 
we use in our analysis.  These measures are director independence (Indep), directors’ 
stock ownership (Own), board and committee structure and share voting rights 
(Structure), individual and full board evaluation systems (System) and board decision 
output (Output).  
 
Indep includes an evaluation of relationships between directors and management (i.e. 
whether they are affiliated with management), and the relationships between 
individual directors through board interlocks as well as how many directorships each 
individual director holds.   Own evaluates the share ownership of directors relative to 
the size of their annual retainer.  Structure examines the separation of CEO and 
Chairman roles, the independence of the audit and compensation committees, and the 
difference between voting and ownership rights of the share capital (often family 
owned firms retain control by holding just a few shares, due to different voting rights 
attached to their shares, Ben-Amar and André, 2006).  System is concerned with the 
performance evaluation of the board of directors, as well as individual directors’ 
performance assessment.  Output examines the level of options granted, re-pricing of 
options and the increase in CEO compensation following a period of poor 
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performance.  In addition, there is consideration of policies which are deemed not to 
be in shareholders’ best interests such as the provision of loans and pensions to 
directors. For further details of the measurement of CG, see the Appendix.   All 
measures of CG are constructed to be increasing in CG quality and therefore our 
hypotheses do not offer any specific predictions for the components of CG. 
  
3.3 Frequency of Disclosure  
In equation (1) below, the main coefficient of interest is CG.  However, we also 
control for other factors which could influence firm disclosure.  We control for firms 
with good news as they may be more likely to release information Lev and Penman 
(1990), and firm size (Size) since larger firms report more frequently than their 
smaller counterparts (Dye, 2001; Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  In addition we control 
for volatility and leverage (Lev) since firms that are riskier because of their with more 
volatile performance or high leverage, may wish to keep market participants informed 
on a more regular basis by releasing a greater number of documents.  Prior evidence 
from Ettredge, Johnstone, Stone and Wang (2011) suggests that omissions of firm 
disclosure are more likely when there is bad news than good news.  Given this, and 
the Toronto Stock Exchange policy requesting balanced disclosure, we also test the 
expectation that firms with better CG may be more balanced in their disclosures and 
are more conservative in releasing information i.e. they release fewer documents 
relative to other firms when there is good news.  We do this by interacting CG with 




To control for time invariant firm fixed effects, we use fixed effects panel data 
estimation methods for our models.  The model used to investigate the frequency of 
disclosure is: 
 	 
 β  β	  	  	    
	   !	  "·	  $%  &	  '	   (1) 
where: 
Log Docs is the natural log of the number of documents released by the firm over the 
year ending 14 days after its annual earnings announcement date; CG is a measure of 
Corporate Governance; Good News is a Dummy variable which takes the value of one 
when the company’s share price outperforms the market over the year and zero 
otherwise; Size is the natural log of total assets at the year-end; Volatility is the 
volatility in daily stock returns over the 90 days before the year’s start; Lev is the 
firm’s year-end leverage measured as total debt to total assets; Goodnews·CG is the 
product of Goodnews and CG;  &	 is a vector of year indicator variables; $% is a vector 
of firm fixed effects; and ε is the error term.  We expect the coefficient on CG to be 
positive and the coefficient on the interaction term · to be negative.   
 
3.4 Timeliness of Price Discovery 
We use the metric developed by Beekes and Brown (2006) to examine the timeliness 
of price discovery. Their metric traces the share price over 365 days ending 14 days 
after the firm’s annual earnings announcement. Specifically, timeliness is defined as: 
()* 





        (2) 
where tP  is the daily market adjusted share price and day 0 is 14 days after the 




The metric essentially measures how quickly the stock price reaches its terminal value 
(i.e. price on day 0); firms which take less time to adjust would have a timeliness 
value near to 0 (i.e. smaller values of timeliness are associated with more timely price 
discovery).  Firms which take longer to release performance information throughout 
the year would have a greater value of timeliness, around 1 (i.e. are less timely).  At 
the individual firm level the metric could be influenced by idiosyncratic share return 
volatility and to acknowledge this we use a measure of timeliness which is deflated by 
one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over period used to calculate the 
share’s timeliness measure denoted Timeliness Deflated.9  However, if companies 
release more timely information, the metric should capture this feature, insofar as it 
feeds into stock prices (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  
 
Again we use fixed effects panel data methods to estimate our models.  The model 
used to investigate the timeliness of price discovery is: 
 ()* ;	 
 β  β	  	  	  
	   !	  "·	  $%  &	  '	  (3) 
 
Variables are as previously defined.   
 
If firms with better CG have more timely price discovery, we would expect a negative 
coefficient on CG and if they are more balanced with respect to good news timeliness, 
the interaction term, ·, will be positive (i.e. suggesting lower timeliness 
of good news relative to other firms).  The models estimated are as described for the 




3.5 Analyst Earnings Forecast Properties and Analyst Following 
Firms with better CG may be perceived as releasing more credible disclosures.    
Therefore to investigate whether market participants (proxied by analysts) have 
superior knowledge about a firm with better CG due to their openness and greater 
transparency, we investigate the properties of analyst forecasts.  We examine the bias 
(i.e. sign of forecast error) which can be positive (optimistic) or negative 
(pessimistic), accuracy (i.e. the absolute forecast error) and the level of dispersion 
(disagreement).  We use the I/B/E/S consensus forecasts to calculate our measures of 
forecast properties.  In addition, we evaluate whether analysts are more likely to track 
firms with better CG. 
 
Equations 4a to 4d below are based upon Beekes and Brown (2006).  In each model 
our primary interest is in the coefficient for CG.  We control for firm size (Size) as 
analysts tend to make more accurate forecasts and disagree less often about the future 
earnings of larger companies. In addition, larger firms generally attract a greater 
analyst following (Bhushan, 1989). We control for the previous year’s forecast error 
over the same forecast horizon (PrevFE) in the Bias model and its absolute value 
(ABS[PrevFE]) in the accuracy, disagreement and following models as prior year 
forecasting ‘success’ or otherwise may influence this year’s forecasts (Michail, 
Walther and Willis, 1997).  Our models also control for firms which have more 
volatile performance proxied by return volatility (Volatility) as it is more challenging 
to make future earnings predictions for such firms.  In addition, we control for the 
length of the forecast horizon i.e. length of time in months until the earnings 
announcement (Horizon) as forecasts tend to improve nearer to the date of the 
earnings release because of the progressive release of information throughout the 
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year. We also control for firms traded on the options market (Option), which can 
provide incentives for analysts to uncover news about a particular firm (Beekes and 
Brown, 2006).   
 
We include variables for analyst following and disagreement in the Bias and 
Accuracy models as they could indicate circumstances that reduce the level of bias 
and increase accuracy in forecasting. We also control for analyst following in the 
Disagreement model as greater analyst following could result in more consistent 
forecasts.  However, it must be acknowledged that even when presented with the same 
disclosures, analysts may weight or interpret the information differently or generate 
additional private information, potentially resulting in greater divergence in beliefs 
(Barron et al. 2005; Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Bamber et al., 1999).  Therefore it is 
entirely possible to have greater optimistic or pessimistic bias and less accuracy in 
forecasting, accompanied by increased disagreement in forecasts where there is 
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where: 
Bias is the signed Forecast Error (FE). Forecast Error (FE) is defined as the mean 
forecast EPS less EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, deflated by the base share price (i.e. 
share price a year before the announcement month); Accuracy is the absolute value of 
the FE, deflated by the base price; Disagreement is the level of disagreement in 
forecasts measured by the standard deviation across analysts’ forecasts for that firm-
month, deflated by the base price; Log Following is the natural log of the number of 
analysts contributing to the consensus forecast; Size is firm size proxied by the natural 
log of the firm’s year-end total assets; PrevFE is the prior year FE for the same firm 
and same forecast horizon, deflated by the previous year’s base price; ABSPrevFE is 
the absolute value of PrevFE, deflated by the previous year’s base price; Volatility is 
calculated from daily returns in the 90 days ended the day before the I/B/E/S forecast 
date; Option is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms with exchange-traded options, and 
0 otherwise; Horizon is the forecast horizon, measured by the number of months from 
the forecast date until the company makes its annual earnings announcement to the 
Toronto Stock Exchange; and CG is as previously defined. 
 
We expect a negative coefficient on CG in the Bias and Accuracy models and a 
positive coefficient on CG in the analyst Following models.  We have no prediction 
for the sign of the CG coefficient in the Disagreement models.   
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
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XX TABLES 1 & 2 XX 
Descriptive statistics for our variables are presented in panel A of Table 1 for the 
frequency of disclosure and timeliness models.  Companies in the sample released 
between 5 and 338 documents per year (Docs).  Timeliness ranges from 0.02 to 2.11, 
with an average of 0.19. Timeliness deflated ranges from 0.02 to 0.67. Our aggregate 
measure of CG (Total) has an average value of 0.62 ranging from 0.25 to 1.00.   Panel 
B of Table 1 shows the industrial sector distribution of our sample.  Almost 30 per 
cent of our sample is from the Mining sector, 28 per cent from Manufacturing, 14 per 
cent from the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector and 14 per cent from the 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services sector.  All 
remaining sectors (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Construction, Retail Trade, 
Services, and Wholesale Trade) each constitute less than 10 per cent of the sample.10 
The sector composition of our sample reflects the underlying importance of natural 
resource and financial companies in Canada and is therefore different from some 
countries (e.g. UK, USA) in this respect.  We can observe that the Services and 
Wholesale Trade sectors have the greatest overall mean Total, although we have no 
prior expectations for this.  
 
Table 2 shows the correlations for the frequency of disclosure and timeliness models.  
The number of documents released (Docs) is positively related with CG (Total) and 
firm size (Size).  There are some differences in direction of the correlation for the 
individual components of CG (Indep, Own, Structure, System, Output) and Docs.  
The two timeliness metrics, timeliness and timeliness deflated are strongly correlated 
(r = 0.92). All measures of CG and Size are negatively correlated with both measures 




XX TABLES 3 & 4 XX 
Tables 3 panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the 
analyst models and panel B shows the distribution of observations by sector and the 
mean sector CG for all CG variables.  There is a small optimistic Bias in analyst 
forecasts relative to actual Earnings Per Share, with the mean Bias being about 0.3 per 
cent of the base share price.  The absolute value of the forecast error (Accuracy) was 
on average 1.4 per cent of the base price. On average 9.6 analysts contributed to the 
I/B/E/S consensus forecast (Following).  The mean value for Total is 0.65, although 
this ranges between 0.25 and 1.00, suggesting there are some significant differences in 
CG practices across firms in our sample.  The Mining and Manufacturing sectors each 
represent 24 per cent of our sample, the Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary Services sector in aggregate represent 19 per cent and the Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate sector in aggregate represent 18 per cent (see Panel B, 
Table 3).  All other industrial sectors each represent less than 10 per cent.  The highest 
composite CG is in the Wholesale Trade sector. 
 
Table 4 shows the correlations for the variables included in the analyst models.  Bias 
and Accuracy are positively correlated (r = 0.40) (See Table 4). In addition, while 
Total is negatively correlated with Bias, Accuracy and Disagreement, it is positively 
correlated with Following.  Some individual components of CG differ in the direction 
of correlation from Total and we will examine this further in multivariate analysis. 
    
4.2 Frequency of Disclosure and Timeliness models 
XX TABLE 5 XX 
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Table 5 reports the firm fixed effects panel regression results for the frequency of 
disclosure and timeliness models estimated with standard errors are clustered by firm 
to control for heteroskedasticity and within firm correlation in the residuals. All 
continuous regressors are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of 
one and for dummy variables, the mean value is subtracted, so that the constant term 
is the mean of the dependent variable.11  Columns (1) – (3) report the results for the 
frequency of disclosure models and columns (4) – (6) report the results for the 
timeliness models.   
 
From hypothesis H1A, we predict firms with better CG will release more documents to 
the stock exchange.  However in model (1) we do not find support for this hypothesis 
as Total is insignificant (Table 5, column 1).  Inclusion of an interaction term between 
good news and CG in model (2) to test hypothesis H1B signals that better governed 
firms are more conservative in releasing documents to the market when there is good 
news relative to other firms, as shown by the negative and significant coefficient on 
Goodnews·Total (Table 5, column 2).  To understand which element of CG is driving 
our results, we re-estimate our model including all CG components and interact all 
CG components with good news.  Our results (Table 5, column 3) show Structure and 
Output are positively associated with the quantity of disclosure.  This is consistent 
with our expectation as firms rated highly on Structure and Output have more 
independent boards and board committees, with shareholders being in a position to 
vote on firm’s activities (and to pressure the firm to disclose more information), along 
with appropriate share option and compensation packages for directors.  The 
interaction terms show there is a lower disclosure for firms with good news which 
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have better systems and output.  Our control variables are generally of the expected 
sign in all frequency of disclosure models. 
 
Our models for timeliness use Timeliness Deflated as the dependent variable as an 
attempt to control for idiosyncratic share volatility which inflates the raw timeliness 
measure (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  In addition, we also control for the firm’s 
volatility in the regression.  Recall, when value relevant information is incorporated 
into share prices more quickly, the timeliness metric is closer to zero. We expect firms 
with better CG to have more timely price discovery under hypothesis H2A.  We find 
no evidence to support our hypothesis in columns (4) or (5) using Total as our 
measure of CG.  In the model using components of CG, only the interaction between 
Goodnews and Indep is negative and significant at 10 per cent, suggesting greater 
timeliness of good news when there is a more independent board inconsistent with 
hypothesis H2B (Table 5, column 6).  Our control variables are generally of the 
expected sign in all timeliness models.  Overall our results suggest CG has little 
relationship with the timeliness of prices in Canada. 
 
To test the robustness of our results, we complete a number of subsequent analyses.  
Firstly, to check for the influence of outliers on our results, we winsorize the 
continuous variables at the top and bottom 2.5 per cent of the distribution and re-
estimate our results (not reported).  We find results consistent to those reported above.  
Next, we estimate our models using different measures of firm size (natural log of 
market capitalisation at the year end and natural log of sales revenue) and results (not 
tabulated) are broadly consistent with those reported above, although there are some 
minor differences in significance in some coefficients.  In addition, we re-code our 
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governance variable by converting the letter grade to a numeric scoring system, with 6 
corresponding to AAA+ and 1 to C and re-estimate the models.  The results (not 
tabulated) are generally consistent with those reported above.  We also estimate the 
frequency of disclosure models using the raw document count as the dependent 
variable and Fixed Effects Poisson estimation methods and obtain consistent results.  
In addition, rather than using Timeliness Deflated we use the raw timeliness measure 
rather than Timeliness Deflated as the dependent variable and find comparable results. 
 
Since our measure of disclosure does not take into account the importance or price 
sensitivity of the disclosure, we create a variable analogous to timeliness of prices for 
the documents released during the year ending 14 days after the earnings 
announcement.  To do this we create a daily time series which has a value of 1 when 
at least one document was released and is zero otherwise.  This daily time series is 
then converted into a cumulative time series.  The timeliness of documents is then 
calculated as: 
()* ; I)* 
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Where 	 denotes the cumulative document count at the end of day t. 
 
As Beekes and Brown (2007, p.17), “we then weight that document-day by the 
absolute value of the stock’s log return that day, which reflects the price sensitivity of 
the documents. The daily time series of returns (which are zero on days when there is 
not any information released to the market) are cumulated so that all days in the series 
have a cumulative value.” We then calculate the timeliness metric based upon this 
stream of returns.  As Timeliness, smaller values of the Timeliness of Documents 




Our results (not tabulated) show lower Timeliness of Documents for better-governed 
firms using Total.  Using the components of CG, Output is associated with lower 
timeliness overall, but with respect to good news, Indep is associated with lower 
timeliness, and Own and System are associated with greater timeliness.  This would 
suggest that firms trade off better CG against greater information timeliness except 
when it comes to good news, where less conservative tendencies can emerge.   
 
We also check the robustness of our results to the sample used.  The resource sector in 
Canada has specific disclosure requirements provided in National Instrument 43-101 
Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects and the Toronto Stock Exchange 
provides specific disclosure guidance for mineral companies, which could have a 
bearing on our results (Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004c).  However, two sample tests 
confirm that the Mining sector does not release more documents on average compared 
with the other sectors in our study (84 documents in mining versus 81 documents in 
other sectors on average, p= 0.2581)12, although it does differ in terms of timeliness.  
The mining sector has less timely price discovery than other sectors (0.162 in Mining 
versus 0.119 in other sectors, p=0.001), as may be expected due to a desire to verify 
resource discoveries before release of information to the market.  We also find 
evidence to suggest CG on average is statistically better in other sectors (0.561 in 
Mining versus 0.641 in other sectors, p= 0.005); the improvement in CG scores is 
driven by significant differences in Independence, System and Output.  A large 
proportion (29 per cent) of the sample is from the Mining sector.  Acknowledging 
these differences we exclude this sector from our estimations and re-estimate our 
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models on the remaining 757 observations.  The results are comparable to those 
reported in Table 5.13   
 
We collect data on US cross-listings for our sample from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Bank of New York.  Just over a third (37 per cent) of our sample 
is cross-listed on a major US exchange which could provide additional incentives for 
disclosure and timeliness.  Two sample tests confirm that the cross-listed firms release 
significantly more documents on average than other firms (98 documents by cross-
listed firms versus 72 documents by other firms, p= 0.001) as expected due to 
additional requirements from US exchanges when listing.  There is also some 
evidence that price discovery is more timely (0.126 for cross-listed firms versus 0.136 
for other firms, p= 0.075).  Cross-listed Canadian firms also have better governance 
on average (0.688 for cross-listed firms versus 0.576 for other firms, p=0.001) which 
is driven by significant differences in all underlying aspects.14  To rule out the 
potential impact of cross-listing on our results, we exclude such firms (leaving 682 
observations remaining) and re-estimate of our models.  We find broadly comparable 
results; of note however is for the frequency of disclosure models the coefficients on 
Output and Goodnews·Output increase in significance, and for the timeliness models, 
the coefficient on Goodnews·Output is negative and now significant at 10 per cent.15   
 
In summary, boards with better structure and better output have greater disclosure 
overall in terms of the numbers of documents released, and firms with a better 
performance evaluation system or better decision output are more balanced in 
disclosures relating to ‘good news’ (i.e. they are more conservative in disclosure), 
consistent with our hypotheses.  There is little relationship between CG and timeliness 
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of prices, although greater board independence is associated with a less conservative 
approach to information timeliness as reflected in the timeliness of prices when there 
is good news. 
 
4.3 Analyst Models 
XX TABLE 6 XX 
The analyst models were estimated by firm fixed effects panel regressions with 
standard errors clustered by firm-year to control for heteroskedasticity and within 
firm-year correlation in the residuals.  The results are shown in Table 6.   All 
regressors are standardized as previously.  
 
We expect firms with better CG will be associated with less optimistically biased 
forecasts which are more accurate and such firms will have greater analyst following.  
Our results for Bias (Table 6, columns 1 and 2) show no significant association with 
Total, but in the component model, Output is positive and significant, indicating 
analysts make more optimistic forecasts for firms with better Output, inconsistent 
with hypothesis H3A.  Accuracy (Table 6, columns 3 and 4) is greater with Total, as 
expected from hypothesis H3B.  In the component model, Indep is negative and 
significant, implying more independent boards are associated with greater Accuracy 
in analyst earnings forecasts, perhaps because such firms would be considered to be 
monitored more by independent directors, resulting in greater credibility in disclosure.  
Disagreement is lower for firms with better overall CG (column 5, Table 6) and this is 
largely due to better Output (column 6, Table 6).  We find a significantly positive 
association between analyst Following and Total consistent with hypothesis H3C, but 
no relationship for the components of CG (columns 7 and 8, Table 6).  The control 
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variables are either largely in line with expectations or statistically insignificant, 
although it is noteworthy that in this sample greater analyst following is associated 
with more accurate forecasts and less disagreement. 
 
To investigate the robustness of our results, we first winsorize the top and bottom 2.5 
percent of the distribution for continuous variables and re-estimate the models.  The 
results (not tabulated) for Total are consistent with those reported in Table 6.  
However, for the components of CG, some differences in significance are apparent, 
but the results are largely comparable, except for Own and System being associated 
with a more pessimistic bias.16  Next we investigate the sensitivity of our results to 
alternative measures of firm size (natural log of year-end market capitalisation, 
natural log of total revenue) and find the results (not tabulated) are comparable to 
those reported in Table 6.  Using the fixed effects Poisson estimation method for the 
analyst Following model (i.e. using the count of the number of analysts tracking the 
firm as the dependent variable), we observe comparable results. 
 
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to the composition of the sample.  Two 
sample tests show that the analyst earnings forecast properties and analyst following 
are statistically different for the Mining sector compared with the rest of the sample 
(p=0.001).17  Exclusion of the Mining sector from the sample leaves 5,419 
observations and results (not tabulated) are broadly consistent with those previously 
reported.  Two sample tests show that all of the analyst earnings forecast properties 
and analyst following are statistically different for cross-listed companies compared 
with the rest of the sample (p=0.003 or better).18  We exclude observations for cross 
listed sample firms which leaves 5,075 observations.  Results (not tabulated) are 
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largely comparable with those previously reported except for the Following model, 
where Total is insignificant, although Indep is positive and significant at 5 per cent.   
 
4.4 Endogeneity 
To take account of potential endogeneity in CG, we re-compute our analysis using 
fixed effects instrumental variables methods.  This requires us to identify instrumental 
variables which are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error, but highly 
correlated with the regressor for which they serve as instruments (Kennedy, 2003, 
p.159).  Selecting an appropriate instrument for CG is not without its challenges.  
Although some prior research has used prior year CG as an instrument for current 
year CG, this procedure may be inappropriate given the inertia (or stickiness) in CG 
structures in adjacent years (Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven, 2011).  We use two 
instruments for firm CG in our models: average sector level of CG excluding the 
observation in question from the calculation, and the average year level of CG 
excluding the observation in question for the calculation.   Interaction variables 
between good news and CG are also instrumented using an interaction between good 
news and the two chosen CG instruments. These instruments provide a benchmark of 
CG quality which firms may strive to attain; and although we do not expect a direct 
relationship between the error term in our models and the average industry CG or the 
average annual CG, we expect there are similar CG expectations for firms in the same 
industry and in the same year.   
 
Our results (not tabulated) show that endogeneity is not a key concern; none of the 
frequency of disclosure and timeliness models and only the component model for 
Disagreement has a significant p-value in tests for endogeneity.  Our instruments are 
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relatively robust according to the Hansen test.  The results are comparable to those 
previously reported, and although the significance of some of the components of CG 
is sensitive to this estimation method, our conclusions are unchanged.   
 
5. Conclusions  
We investigate the influence of CG on the flow of information to the market in 
Canada for S&P/TSX Composite Index firms between 2002 and 2007. We use the 
Board Shareholder Confidence Index as our measure of CG.  Our fixed effects models 
examine the overall aggregate CG for a firm, as well as underlying aspects such as the 
independence directors of the board, directors’ share ownership, the presence of a 
separate CEO and Chairman and independent board committees, and comparability in 
share capital voting and ownership rights, director performance evaluation systems 
and the output from board decisions. We take a three-pronged approach to triangulate 
our findings and provide different insights into the relationship between CG and 
information flows.   
 
This study uses a panel of CG data enabling fixed effects regression methods to be 
employed.  Unlike Beekes and Brown (2006) who find greater disclosure and more 
timely price discovery for firms with better CG, we find aggregate CG has little 
relationship with disclosure frequency or timeliness of price discovery.  However, this 
aggregate measure of CG masks the fact that individual CG aspects can ‘pull in 
different directions’.  Firms with better structure and board decision output with 
regard to director compensation are found to release more information.  Also firms 
with more independent boards show less conservative tendencies to with regard to the 




With regard to analyst following, we find a positive association between aggregate 
CG and the number of analysts following the firm.  Consequently, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are more accurate and there is less dispersion (i.e. lower disagreement) in 
them.  This is contrary to results from Beekes and Brown (2006) who find greater 
disagreement in analysts’ forecasts for better-governed firms.  Individual governance 
aspects show more independent boards are associated with greater forecast accuracy, 
but earnings forecasts firms with better board decision output are optimistic 
suggesting analysts overweight the credibility of information provided.   
 
We attribute the differences between our study for Canada and Beekes and Brown’s 
(2006) results for Australian companies to our better data and use of more robust 
estimation methods.  We use a panel of CG data enabling panel data methods to be 
employed, whereas Beekes and Brown (2006) only use one year of CG data expecting 
this to be representative for their entire sample period.  Our results are relatively 
robust to a number of alternative specifications and in particular, our tests indicate 
endogeneity is not a major problem in our study.   
 
Our work contributes to a growing literature on CG and disclosure.  Future work 
could investigate this idea in a cross country analysis to determine whether CG works 
similarly in countries with different legal frameworks and levels of investor 
protection. There could also be examination of whether the link between information 
disclosures and CG translates into more favourable cost of capital.  However we leave 





                                                 
1 By ‘better’ we refer to the firm being more highly rated on the Board Shareholder Confidence Index 
measure of CG. 
2 CG guidelines are now provided in National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance available on the 
internet at  http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/NP58-201_CGGuidelines_Apr15-05.pdf   and guidelines for 
disclosure Guidelines National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices.  
Companies are also provided with guidance by the Toronto Stock Exchange as to what represents good 
CG disclosure (Toronto Stock Exchange, 2006). 
3 The BSCI data is publicly available from the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board 
Effectiveness webpage http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ccbe/details.aspx?ContentID=211  
4 Mandatory corporate filings in the form of press releases, annual reports and financial statements are 
released via SEDAR in accordance with National Instrument 13-101. Therefore this could imply price 
sensitivity, as determined by Canadian securities authorities. Beekes and Brown (2006) focused on 
documents classified by the Australian Stock Exchange as price sensitive. However, they reported their 
results were not sensitive to the inclusion of both price and non-price sensitive documents in their 
models.  Thus, the fact that some releases on SEDAR would not be price sensitive should be less 
concern. 
5 The 1,079 observations relates to 245 unique firms covered by the BSCI over our sample period.  This 
is broken down across our sample period as follows: 2002: 166 firms, 2003: 182 firms, 2004: 183 
firms, 2005: 191 firms, 2006: 186 firms; and 2007: 171 firms. 
6 In our sample, a firm may appear up to 11 times per firm-financial year as the data is on a monthly 
basis and there are 167 unique firms included in our sample.  Observations across our sample period in 
calendar years is as follows: 2002: 1,000 observations, 2003: 1,181 observations, 2004: 1,204 
observations, 2005: 1,193 observations; 2006: 1,310 observations and 2007: 1,261 observations.   
There are a relatively large number of cases where the same firm appears in our sample across a 
number of years. 
7 As in Aggarwal et al. (2011), where CG data is missing for a particular firm year, we forward and 
back-fill values of CG by 1 year to create a more complete panel of data for analysis.  This procedure is 
justified by the stickiness in CG measures (Brown, Beekes, Verhoeven, 2011). 
8 In robustness testing, we transformed the letter grade to a numeric scoring system for data analysis, 
with 6 corresponding to AAA+ and 1 to C, and recalculate our results. 
9 We also run our models using the raw timeliness metric in sensitivity analysis and results are 
comparably similar. 
10 Due to the small number of observations for the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (N=6), and the 
Construction (N=2) sectors, we exclude these 8 observations from our models and find our results are 
unchanged. 
11 For interaction variables, first we normalise the continuous variable as described.   Then we take the 
product of the dummy variable and the normalised continuous variable and subtract the mean of this 
new variable. 
12 This result is not entirely unexpected for the Mining sector.  As Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) 
acknowledge that disclosure can be costly for firms and it could also give rival firms information about 
their competitive advance, providing disincentives for disclosure. 
13 We also run our models solely for the Mining sector (N=322) and find CG is insignificant in all 
frequency of disclosure models, but in the timeliness models Output is negative and significant at 10 
per cent.  Therefore CG appears to impact only on timeliness where there are additional requirements 
for disclosure, as in the Mining sector in Canada. 
14 This is to be expected as firms cross-listed on the US are required to follow more detailed stock 
exchange regulatory rules particularly post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
15 We run our results solely for cross-listed firms (N=397) and find the interaction between Goodnews 
and Total is negative and significant at 10 per cent for the frequency of disclosure models.  In the 
timeliness models, we find Indep is positive and significant at 5 per cent and the interaction between 
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Indep and Goodnews is negative and significant at 5 per cent.  Therefore for cross-listed firms 
timeliness is lower (greater) for bad (good) news where there is a more independent board.  This 
perhaps suggests that there is a substitution relationship between timeliness and CG when a firm is 
cross-listed. 
16 The primary differences from results reported in Table 6 are as follows: Indep is insignificant in all 
analyst models implying directors’ independence is unimportant in relation to analysts’ forecasts and 
following.  Own and System are associated with a pessimistic bias as predicted from hypothesis H3A. 
Structure is associated with less disagreement, and Output is associated with more optimistic forecasts 
only.   
17 Estimation of results of the analyst models for Mining firms only (N=1,730) we find Own is 
associated with less forecast optimism, and independence is associated with greater analysts following 
but Structure is associated with fewer analysts tracking the firm.   
18 Estimating results for cross-listed firms only (N=2,074), we find Structure is associated with more 
optimistic forecasts and greater analyst following suggesting analysts may over weight information 
credibility for firms with better board and share capital structures.  System is found to be associated 
with greater accuracy and lower disagreement.  We also find evidence of greater disagreement with 
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Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI) 
 
The CG indices, described in detail below measure: (i) board independence, (ii) 
directors’ ownership, (iii) board and board committee structure and voting rights, (iv) 
performance evaluation systems and (v) board decision output.  These five underlying 
measures are summarized in an overall index of CG.  For each of the variables, we 
assume the firm starts with 100 points, from which deductions are made for aspects 
not meeting the expected standard of CG.  Each governance values used in the models 
of this study is rescaled so that it lies between 0 and 1.  Values for the variables 




Director independence evaluates the relationships between the directors and 
management, as well as the relationships between individual directors on the board to 
determine independence (Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board 
Effectiveness, 2005).  The measure includes independence from management, the 
presence of interlocking board memberships and the ’busyness’ of directors.   
 
(i) Affiliated directors: A director is considered affiliated with management if they 
are a(n): “(i) Employee of the company (currently or within three years); (ii) 
Executive of any affiliated company; (iii) Director or Director’s firm provides legal, 
auditing, or consulting services to the company (within the last 3 years); (iv) Kinship 
to CEO or Chair (if Chair holds >10% of company’s shares) or (v) Any other 
significant relationship deemed material  that does not fall under the above 
categories.” (Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness, 2005, 
p.1).  It is expected that two-thirds of the board will be independent, otherwise 
deductions are made.  Deductions are as follows based upon the percentage of 
independent directors: (i) Less than 30%  = - 15; (ii) 30% - 50% = -10 (iii) 50% - 60% 
= -5; (iv) 60% - 66.7% = -3.  There is no deduction if greater than two thirds of the 
board is independent.   
 
(ii) Board Interlocks: A deduction of 5 is made if there is greater than one board 
interlock (i.e. directors being members of more than one board of directors at the 
same time as another director of the company).   
 
(iii) Busyness of Directors: There is a deduction of 5 (per board member as 
appropriate) if any board member holds greater than 5 board memberships at any one 
time. 
 
The overall deductions for independence are based upon the three components and 
letter grades are awarded as follows: 
 
Independence Total Deductions Letter Grade Awarded  Indep 
No Deduction AAA 1.00 
-3 AA 0.97 
-5 A 0.95 
-8 B 0.92 







This measure examines the average level of directors’ stock ownership (for third of 
board with lowest ownership of shares) compared with size of directors’ annual 
retainer.  Note: The retained includes any deferred shares.  Deductions are made if the 
multiple is less than four times.  The table below shows the deductions made below 
and the letter grade awarded. 
 
Ownership Multiple Deduction Letter Grade Awarded Own 
4 or more No deduction AAA 1.00 
3-4 -3 AA 0.97 
2-3 -5 A 0.95 
1-2 -10 B 0.90 
<1 -15 C 0.85 
 
*Note this was amended in 2007 to also include cases where the director has no annual 
retainer.  In addition to the above, where there is no retainer no deductions are made if 
the director owns at least $30,000 of shares.  Between $25,000 and $25,999 of share 
ownership, a deduction of 3 is made.  Between $20,000 and $24,999 of share 
ownership, a deduction of 5 is made, between $10,000 and $19,999 of share 
ownership a deduction of 10 is made and less than $10,000 of share ownership, there 




This measure examines the separation of Chair and CEO, the level of independence of 
audit and compensation committee members and ratio of voting to ownership rights 
on share classes.   
 
(i) CEO/Chair Duality: If the same person takes the role of CEO and Chair, there is 
a deduction of 10.  If there is a split in roles, but the chair is affiliated, the deduction is 
7.  If there is no split in CEO and Chair roles, or if there is a split and the Chair is 
affiliated but a lead director is appointed in both cases, a deduction of 5 is made. 
 
(ii) Audit and Compensation Committee Composition: There is a presumption that 
the audit and compensation board committees should comprise independent directors.  
For each committee where there is not full independence, there is a deduction of 10.   
 
(iii) Share Voting Structures:  This evaluates the links between voting and 
ownership rights.  Deductions are made if the voting rights are disproportionate to the 
ownership rights on shares.  The deductions are as follows: if <20% of Equity 
Controls >80% of Votes, the deduction is 30.  If 40% or Less Equity Controls 60% or 
More Votes, the deduction is 20.  If  <50% of Equity controls >50% of Votes, the 
deduction is 15.  There is no deduction if the voting rights equal the ownership rights, 





The overall grading of Structure based on the three above elements is as follows: 
Structure Deduction Letter Grade Awarded Structure 
No Deduction AAA 1.00 
-5 AA 0.95 
-10 A 0.90 
-20 B 0.80 





This aspect looks at the evaluation process for boards as a whole and individual 
directors.  If there is no process in place for the performance evaluation of the board 
as a whole, there is a deduction of 10.  If there is no performance evaluation process 
in place for individual directors, there is a deduction of 5. 
 
System Deduction Letter Grade Awarded System 
No Deduction AAA 1.00 
-5 AA 0.95 
-10 A 0.90 




This element evaluates board decision output and examines whether options granted 
to executives result in a significant dilution to the share capital.  It also examines 
whether there has been any option re-pricing and the CEO’s compensation relative to 
the share price.  From 2005, there was inclusion of whether there is an evergreen 
option plan, loans made to directors and pension plans for directors. 
 
(i) Options & Dilution: Following guidance from the Toronto Stock Exchange, a 
deduction of 10 is made if options granted are greater than 10 percent of the 
outstanding shares as this would represent a significant dilution.  A deduction of 5 is 
also made if grants to the CEO are greater than 5 per cent of outstanding shares. 
 
(ii) Option Re-pricing: A deduction of 20 is made if there has been re-pricing of 
options in the last three years.  This is considered to represent a change in 
performance target for directors in relation to events and is not consistent with 
encouraging good performance. 
 
(iii) CEO Compensation: Due to concern over ‘reward for failure to perform’, a 
deduction of 15 is made in situations when the share price decreases by 25 per cent, 
but the CEOs total compensation increases by 25 per cent in the following year. 
 
(iv) Evergreen Options: Evergreen option plans allow granting of options up to a 
certain percentage dilution without further shareholder approval.  This is considered 
not in the interests of shareholders and a deduction of 5 is made if such an agreement 




(v) Loans: Loans to directors and executives are considered to be an inappropriate use 
of funds.  There is a deduction of 15 if there are outstanding interest free loans, a 
deduction of 10 if outstanding loans are interest bearing, but a deduction of only 5 if 
the firm has outstanding loans, but has discontinued this practice. 
 
(vi) Director pensions: There is also a deduction of 10 if directors receive pensions 
as this is considered to be a conflict with shareholders’ best interests.      
 
Based upon the six items above, the deductions are made and the overall letter grade 
is awarded:  
Output Deduction Letter Grade Awarded Output 
No Deduction AAA 1.00 
-5 AA 0.95 
-10 A 0.90 
-20 B 0.80 
-30 0.70 
 
Total aggregate Corporate Governance (Total): 
 
An aggregate measure is then awarded based upon the number of deductions for the 
five underlying measures. 
 
Total Overall Score after deductions Letter Grade Awarded Total 
100 AAA+ 1.00 
95 AAA 0.95 
90 AA 0.90 
75 A 0.75 
50 B 0.50 
<50 C 0.25 
  
 






PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Frequency of Disclosure and Timeliness Models 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Docs 81.635 38.848 74 5 338 
Log Docs 4.294 0.482 4.304 1.609 5.823 
Timeliness 0.190 0.184 0.135 0.019 2.111 
Timeliness Deflated 0.132 0.086 0.112 0.019 0.665 
Size 7.623 1.897 7.405 2.245 13.303 
Good news 0.487 0.500 0 0 1 
Volatility 0.019 0.011 0.016 0.001 0.139 
Lev 0.202 0.158 0.189 0 0.771 
Indep 0.970 0.033 0.970 0.900 1 
Own 0.966 0.051 1 0.850 1 
Structure 0.907 0.094 0.950 0.750 1 
System 0.926 0.071 0.950 0.850 1 
Output 0.947 0.075 1 0.700 1 





PANEL B: Descriptive Statistics by Industrial Sector 

















 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 6 0.56 0.97 1.00 0.87 0.89 0.95 0.54 
 Construction 2 0.19 0.92 0.95 0.75 0.85 0.9 0.25 
 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 151 13.99 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.67 
 Manufacturing 300 27.8 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.63 
 Mining 322 29.84 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.56 
 Retail Trade 78 7.23 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.96 0.58 
 Services 62 5.75 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.71 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services 147 13.62 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.64 
 Wholesale Trade 11 1.02 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.71 
 
Note: The sample (N=1,079) is constructed from the set of Canadian companies rated in the Board Shareholder Confidence Index. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for 
the variables in the frequency of disclosure and timeliness models.  Panel B shows the distribution of observations by sector and the mean values of each of the Corporate 
Governance variables by sector.  The variables are defined as follows: Docs is the annual number of documents as retrieved from the SEDAR website from 2002-2007.  Ldocs 
denotes the natural logarithm (log) of Docs.  Timeliness is the timeliness metric, measured as the average daily absolute difference between the log of the market-adjusted 
share price that day and the log of market-adjusted share price 14 days after the release of the firm’s EPS for the year. Timeliness deflated is the timeliness metric divided by 
one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the period used to calculate the share’s timeliness metric. Size is proxied by the log of the firm’s total assets at the year 
end. Good news is a dummy variable with a value of one if the market adjusted return over the 365 days ended 14 days after the release date is positive, and is zero otherwise. 
Volatility is calculated from daily log returns in the 90 days ending the day before we observe the first price for the timeliness metric.  Indep is a measure of director 
independence, Own is a measure of directors’ stock ownership, Structure is a measure of board and committee structures and share capital structure, System is a measure of 
evaluation systems for the board of directors as a whole, as well as individual directors, and Output is a measure of board decision output.  Total is an aggregate measure of 




    
Table 2 
Correlations of Variables used in Frequency of Disclosure and Timeliness Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1. Docs 1.00 
2. Log Docs  0.92 1.00 
3. Timeliness -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
4. Timeliness Deflated -0.03 -0.03 0.92 1.00 
5. Size 0.23 0.24 -0.40 -0.44 1.00 
6. Good news 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.07 1.00 
7. Volatility 0.05 0.05 0.50 0.48 -0.52 0.13 1.00 
8. Lev 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.10 0.20 -0.03 -0.20 1.00 
9. Indep -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.07 1.00 
10. Own -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.17 0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.07 1.00 
11. Structure 0.12 0.13 -0.10 -0.10 0.11 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 0.30 0.16 1.00 
12. System 0.12 0.12 -0.21 -0.22 0.36 -0.06 -0.28 0.11 0.24 0.21 0.20 1.00 
13. Output -0.04 -0.05 -0.19 -0.21 0.18 -0.03 -0.17 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 1.00 
14. Total 0.08 0.08 -0.21 -0.22 0.27 -0.04 -0.25 0.05 0.47 0.39 0.69 0.56 0.45 1.00 
 





PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics for Analysts’ Models 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Bias 0.003 0.035 0.000 -0.370 0.464 
Accuracy 0.014 0.032 0.005 0.000 0.464 
Disagreement 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.000 0.228 
Following 9.579 3.978 9 4 27 
Log Following 2.175 0.416 2.197 1.386 3.296 
Size 8.056 2.087 7.905 -0.968 13.303 
PrevFE 0.002 0.027 0 -0.370 0.299 
ABS Prev FE 0.013 0.024 0.005 0.000 0.370 
Volatility 0.015 0.007 0.014 0.001 0.094 
Horizon 6.018 3.165 6 1 11 
Option 0.336 0.473 0 0 1 
Indep 0.971 0.033 0.970 0.900 1 
Own 0.970 0.048 1 0.850 1 
Structure 0.909 0.095 0.95 0.750 1 
System 0.938 0.069 1 0.850 1 
Output 0.957 0.068 1 0.700 1 





PANEL B: Descriptive Statistics by Industrial Sector 
 

















 Construction 21 0.29 0.92 0.95 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.25 
 Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 1,298 18.16 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.72 
 Manufacturing 1,685 23.57 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.64 
 Mining 1,730 24.2 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.60 
 Retail Trade 621 8.69 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.93 0.98 0.60 
 Services 394 5.51 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.78 
 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services 1,336 18.69 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.95 0.96 0.65 
 Wholesale Trade 64 0.9 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.80 
 
 
The sample (N=7,149) is constructed from the set of Canadian companies with I/B/E/S annual EPS forecasts, from 2002-2007. The sample is restricted to cases where at least 
4 analysts contributed to the forecasts on the summary file. The sample firms must also be rated in the Board Shareholder Confidence Index. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics for the variables in the analyst models and Panel B shows the distribution of observations by sector and the mean values of each of the Corporate Governance 
variables by sector.  The variables are defined as follows: Forecast Error (FE) is defined as the mean forecast EPS less actual EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, and is deflated by 
base price (stock price one day before the I/B/E/S cutoff date for forecasts made a year before the release date). Bias is the signed FE and Accuracy is its absolute value. 
Disagreement is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for that firm month, deflated by base price. Following is the number of analysts contributing to the consensus 
forecast.  Log Following is the natural log of Following.  Size is proxied by the natural log of total assets at the year end. Prev FE is the prior year’s FE is for the same firm 
and for the same horizon, deflated by previous year’s base price. ABSPrev FE is the absolute value of Prev FE, deflated by previous year’s base price.  Volatility is calculated 
from daily returns in the 90 days ended the day before the I/B/E/S forecast date.   Horizon is the forecast horizon measured as the number of months from the forecast date 
until the company releases its annual earnings to the TSX. Option is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms with exchange traded options, 0 otherwise. Indep is a measure of 
director independence, Own is a measure of directors’ stock ownership, Structure is a measure of board and committee structures and share capital structure, System is a 
measure of evaluation systems for the board of directors as a whole, as well as for individual directors, and Output is a measure of board decision output.  Total is an 
aggregate measure of Corporate Governance.   
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Table 4 Variable Correlations for Analyst Models 
 
Notes: N= 7,149.  Variable definitions as Table 3.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1. Bias 1.00   
2. Accuracy 0.40 1.00   
3. Disagreement 0.09 0.37 1.00   
4. Following -0.04 -0.05 0.04 1.00   
5. Log Following -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.97 1.00   
6. Size -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 0.34 0.32 1.00   
7. Prev FE -0.02 0.11 0.20 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 1.00   
8. ABS Prev FE 0.06 0.30 0.41 -0.05 -0.07 -0.12 0.19 1.00   
9. Volatility 0.08 0.16 0.26 -0.08 -0.10 -0.38 0.06 0.21 1.00   
10. Horizon 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.22 -0.04 1.00   
11. Option -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.48 0.45 0.46 -0.08 -0.09 -0.17 -0.03 1.00   
12. Indep -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.15 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 1.00   
13. Own -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 0.15 0.15 0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.18 0.10 1.00   
14. Structure 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.14 0.24 0.22 1.00   
15. System -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.21 0.22 0.26 -0.03 -0.04 -0.18 0.01 0.22 0.18 0.25 0.20 1.00   
16. Output 0.00 -0.12 -0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.08 1.00  
17. Total -0.06 -0.13 -0.12 0.22 0.22 0.20 -0.03 -0.05 -0.19 0.00 0.17 0.42 0.45 0.72 0.54 0.43 1.00 
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Table 5:  
Results for the Frequency of Disclosure and Timeliness Models (N=1,079) 












Column No.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total 0.011 0.030  -0.005 -0.004  
 (0.65) (1.55)  (1.08) (0.80)  
Indep   -0.024   0.002 
   (1.23)   (0.50) 
Own   0.011   0.008 
   (0.51)   (1.63) 
Structure   0.039   -0.006 
   (1.84)*   (1.12) 
System   0.000   0.000 
   (0.01)   (0.03) 
Output   0.039   -0.005 
   (2.46)**   (1.02) 
Goodnews 0.039 0.040 0.042 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (2.03)** (2.16)** (2.29)** (0.36) (0.38) (0.24) 
Size 0.181 0.188 0.208 -0.070 -0.070 -0.071 
 (2.78)*** (2.86)*** (3.18)*** (4.26)*** (4.22)*** (4.39)*** 
Volatility 0.044 0.044 0.040 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (2.20)** (2.17)** (1.93)* (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) 
Lev -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 0.020 0.020 0.022 
 (0.51) (0.43) (0.35) (2.84)*** (2.85)*** (3.08)*** 
Goodnews·Total  -0.041   -0.002  
  (2.21)**   (0.48)  
Goodnews·Indep   0.007   -0.010 
   (0.39)   (1.89)* 
Goodnews·Own   0.018   -0.002 
   (0.87)   (0.33) 
Goodnews·Structure   -0.023   0.007 
   (1.13)   (1.19) 
Goodnews·System   -0.035   -0.002 
   (1.78)*   (0.33) 
Goodnews·Output   -0.037   -0.005 
   (1.84)*   (0.92) 
F-test 12.00*** 11.41*** 7.48*** 3.67*** 3.37*** 3.22*** 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 
No of Clusters 245 245 245 245 245 245 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 two-tailed tests 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  Columns (1) – (3) show the results for the frequency of 
disclosure models and columns (4) – (6) show the results for the timeliness models.  All regressors are 




Results for Analyst Models (N=7,149) 




Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total -0.000  -0.004  -0.001  0.021  
 (0.07)  (1.74)*  (2.95)***  (1.82)*  
Indep  0.001  -0.003  -0.000  0.011 
  (0.35)  (1.74)*  (0.86)  (1.06) 
Own  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.006 
  (1.56)  (1.63)  (1.55)  (0.49) 
Structure  0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.98)  (0.91)  (1.48)  (0.05) 
System  -0.003  -0.001  -0.000  0.014 
  (1.28)  (0.29)  (0.76)  (1.32) 
Output  0.007  -0.001  -0.001  0.003 
  (2.13)**  (0.60)  (1.98)**  (0.25) 
Log Following 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001   
 (0.76) (0.76) (2.20)** (2.25)** (2.44)** (2.55)**   
Disagreement -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001     
 (1.14) (1.05) (0.35) (0.33)     
Size -0.009 -0.004 -0.014 -0.015 -0.002 -0.002 0.265 0.258 
 (0.60) (0.31) (0.99) (1.08) (0.64) (0.78) (2.98)*** (2.94)*** 
PrevFE -0.007 -0.007       
 (2.08)** (2.18)**       
ABS(PrevFE)   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.013 
   (0.42) (0.41) (2.03)** (1.99)** (1.47) (1.42) 
Volatility -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.28) (0.47) (0.15) (0.15) (2.51)** (2.58)** (1.82)* (1.86)* 
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Horizon 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.018 
 (1.71)* (1.73)* (6.01)*** (6.07)*** (6.47)*** (6.44)*** (4.33)*** (4.32)*** 
Option -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.46) (0.19) (0.08) (0.10) (1.41) (1.39) (0.12) (0.16) 
F-test 1.12 1.79** 8.09*** 6.52*** 6.10*** 5.14*** 9.79*** 7.69*** 
Adj. R2 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.10 
No of Clusters 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 two-tailed tests 
Notes: For variable definitions, see Table 3.  Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the analyst earnings forecast Bias models; columns (3) and (4) show the results for the 
analyst forecast Accuracy models; columns (5) and (6) show the results for the analyst Disagreement models; and columns (7) and (8) show the results for the analyst 
Following models.   All regressors are normalised to assist interpretation.  t-statistics with standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses. 
